An adverse social welfare effect of quadruply gainful trade by Stark, Oded & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz
University of Tübingen
Working Papers in
Business and Economics
No. 138
An adverse social welfare effect
of quadruply gainful trade
by
Oded Stark, Grzegorz Kosiorowski
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
www.wiwi.uni-tuebingen.de
https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/handle/10900/95156
 
 
An adverse social welfare effect of quadruply gainful trade 
 
by 
Oded Stark 
Universities of Bonn, Tuebingen, and, Warsaw 
 
and  
 
Grzegorz Kosiorowski 
Cracow University of Economics, Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mailing Address: Oded Stark                                                                    September 2020 
 ZEF, University of Bonn  
 Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 
  D-53113 Bonn 
  Germany 
 
E-mail Address: ostark@uni-bonn.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Acknowledging that individuals dislike having low relative income renders trade less 
attractive when seen as a technology that integrates two economies by merging separate 
social spheres into one. We define a “trembling trade” as a situation in which gains from 
trade are less than losses in relative income, with the result that global social welfare is 
reduced. We show that a “trembling trade” can arise even when trade is more gainful in 
four ways: through trade the absolute income of everyone increases, the income gap in 
both economies is reduced, as is the income gap between the trading economies. 
However, trade brings populations, economies, or markets that were not previously 
connected closer together in social space. As a consequence, separate social spheres 
merge, and people’s social space and their comparators are altered. Assuming that people 
like high (absolute) income and dislike low relative income, the aggregate increase in 
unhappiness caused by the trade-induced escalation in relative deprivation can result in a 
negative overall impact of trade on (utilitarian-measured) social welfare, if the absolute 
income gains are not large enough to mitigate the relative income losses.  
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1. Introduction and motivation  
At least since Stolper and Samuelson demonstrated in 1941 in a formal general 
equilibrium model that when an economy leaves a state of autarky to engage in trade with 
other economies, not everyone’s real income rises, a view has been held that if as a result 
of trade everyone’s income is made to rise (redistributive policies can see to that), one of 
two potential unwarranted consequences of free trade (that the incomes of some people 
fall) need not be worrisome. A second concern regarding the repercussions of free trade 
has been a possible rise in the income gap between the trading economies: even when 
trade between, say, a relatively rich economy P2 and a relatively poor economy P1 
confers gains so that everyone’s income increases, trade can be viewed with some 
trepidation if the income gap between P2 and P1 widens. However, when everyone’s 
income increases and the income gap between P2 and P1 does not widen, let alone when 
this gap decreases, then, in general, trade is considered beneficial.  
A theoretical foundation of the gains from trade can be traced back to Ricardo’s 
(1817) law of comparative advantage. Rising productivity and increasing national income 
brought about by international trade, as predicted by Ricardo, are repercussions that were 
confirmed empirically, for example by MacDougall (1951, 1952), Golub and Hsieh 
(2000), Melitz (2003), Bernhofen and Brown (2005), Irwin (2005), Amiti and Konings 
(2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), and Etkes and Zimring (2015). However, since Ricardo’s 
“Principles,” economists have also been aware that the distributional consequences of 
trade are distinct from the rising incomes consequences of trade. Anything that 
exacerbates inequality has for long been considered problematic, trade included. A 
concern has been expressed that even when the incomes of all involved increase and the 
income gap between P2 and P1 narrows, trade can still fail to increase global social 
welfare when, as a result of engagement in trade, the following happens: the income 
distribution within P2 or the income distribution within P1 or the income distributions 
within both widen (the incomes of the richer members of P2 increase by more than the 
incomes of the poorer members of P2 and / or the incomes of the richer members of P1 
increase by more than the incomes of the poorer members of P1). This concern is usually 
based on the trade models of Ohlin (1933) and Stolper and Samuelson (1941). For 
example, Berman et al. (1998) view trade as a cause of a simultaneous rise in wage 
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inequality in developed and developing economies. Barro (2000) finds that trade 
openness increased inequality in developing countries. Lundberg and Squire (2003) 
identify a positive correlation between trade liberalization and higher within-country 
income inequality. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) observe that across a number of 
developing countries, significant increases in inequality were a typical consequence of 
trade liberalization after the 1970s. Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), Burstein and Vogel (2011), and Sampson (2014) list a variety of 
reasons why greater economic integration between countries may cause wage inequality 
to rise within countries. Antràs et al. (2017), who measure the gains from trade by adding 
to the classical real income gain a term that measures the inequality cost, conclude that 
trade-induced increases in inequality “eat up” about 20% of the US gain from trade. 
Studying European Union integration, Beckfield (2009) observes both a decrease in 
inequality between countries, and an increase in inequality within countries. On the other 
hand, Calderon and Chong (2001) find that, at least in developed countries, an increase in 
the volume of trade is positively correlated with a long-run decline in the in-country 
income inequality. What the current paper seeks to establish is that even when on all four 
counts trade is beneficial (namely when it increases the income of every individual in P1 
and in P2, narrows the income gap between P2 and P1, narrows the income gap within 
P1, and narrows the income gap within P2), trade can still fail to raise global social 
welfare. 
In a recent paper, Stark et al. (2018) present a constructive example why trade that 
increases the absolute income of every member of the trading economies and narrows the 
income gap between the economies can at the same time lower global social welfare. The 
core idea of the paper by Stark et al. is that trade affects social relations which, in turn, 
are likely to bring about changes in social welfare. Trade may modify social relations in a 
variety of ways, which include revising social ties, broadening social horizons, and 
forging new social interactions: trade does not occur only in geographical space; it leaves 
footprints in the social sphere. The participation of economies in trade can enlarge the 
social space of the members of the economies. This expansion impacts on how these 
members value and assess the benefits that trade confers. Stark et al. build on the notion 
that individuals’ preferences are social in nature. This perspective incorporates the 
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concepts of social space, relative income, and relative income deprivation (defined in 
Section 2 below). Stark et al. use the term “trembling trade” to describe a situation in 
which the negative effect on the welfare of the trading economies that arises from the 
trade-induced shake-up of their social spheres is greater than the gains brought about by 
trade in the form of income increases and reduced income gap between the trading 
economies. 
In this paper we present a general theory of a “trembling trade” - a situation in 
which gains from trade are less than losses in relative income - and we use the theory to 
show that even a quadruply gainful trade, meaning trade that increases the absolute 
income of everyone, reduces the income gap in both of the two trading economies, and 
narrows the income gap between the trading economies, can lower global social welfare.  
Although it is not typical for trade to be quadruply gainful, our strategy is to show 
that even when the economic data appear as favorable as possible, trade can still be 
detrimental to global social welfare. In fact, the “trembling trade” outcome does not 
depend on the assumption that trade is quadruply gainful (consult Comment 1 in Section 
4). Suppose that trade fails to satisfy one of the assumptions that render it being 
quadruply gainful. For example, suppose that trade raises all incomes, and brings about 
convergence between countries and declining inequality in the poorer country, but no 
reduction in inequality in the rich country. In such a case where trade is triply gainful, 
trade is even more prone to be trembling, and the fact that it is trembling is just less 
surprising. Logically, then, it suffices to consider the case of quadruply gainful trade and 
“export” the results of such an analysis to other trade configurations. 
We view trade as a process which, as a result of market transactions involving an 
exchange of goods or services, brings populations, economies, or markets that previously 
were not connected closer together in social space. As a consequence of this integration, 
separate social spheres merge, and people’s social space and their comparators are 
altered. Then, the perceived relative incomes of some individuals, calculated in the 
context of the broader social space, may decrease even if through trade the absolute 
income of everyone increases, the income gap within each economy is reduced, as is the 
income gap between the trading economies. Consequently, in and by itself, the 
integration of social spaces may exacerbate the discontent that some individuals 
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experience from having low relative income. We represent people’s concern about low 
relative income by means of a measure of relative income deprivation: we say that an 
individual experiences relative deprivation when his income falls behind the incomes of 
other individuals who constitute his comparison group. Assuming that people like high 
(absolute) income and dislike low relative income, we show that the aggregate increase in 
dismay caused by the trade-induced escalation in relative deprivation can result in a 
negative overall impact of trade on (utilitarian-measured) social welfare, if the absolute 
income gains are not large enough to mitigate the relative income losses.  
The trade-generated expansion of a social space can arise via several channels. 
First, purchased goods convey information about trading partners, in particular about the 
productivity of labor and about incomes in the partner economy. This channel operates 
even in the sterile world of perfect Walrasian markets. A second channel results from the 
interactions of people in non-Walrasian environments where trade requires social 
interactions aimed at matching trading partners and at mediation which, to different 
extents, removes the information gap between the trading economies. Third, in order to 
facilitate and intensify trade, trading partners introduce mechanisms and procedures that 
also reduce the social divide between them. In the context of international trade, 
monetary unification (an event that has occurred in Europe seven times since 1999) is one 
such example.1 Fourth, trade invites, and is often based on, exchanges of traders, trade 
representatives, trade delegations, and experts of various types. Presence and exposure 
foster comparisons. Fifth, trade is built on a study of the needs, preferences, consumption 
habits, and demands of the partners in trade; the expansion of commercial space brings in 
its wake an expansion of social space. Sixth, trade is often the precursor of migration, and 
migrants facilitate and intensify cross-cultural awareness and inter-economy social ties. 
 
1 Stark and Wlodarczyk (2015, p. 185) reason as follows. “The introduction of a common currency is an 
instrument of fundamental change in economic and social relations in general, and in interpersonal 
comparisons of earnings, pay, and incomes in particular. Although, prior to the introduction of the euro as a 
common currency, individuals in specific European countries were able to compare their incomes with the 
incomes of individuals in other European countries, the comparison was not immediate; it required effort to 
convert incomes denominated in different currencies, and it was presumably not done very often. … When 
a single currency is introduced, the comparison environment changes, enabling, indeed inviting, simpler 
comparisons with others. For example, with currency unification, workers who perform the same task and 
who are employed by a manufacturer with plants located in different EMU countries can compare their 
earnings with each other directly, effortlessly, and routinely.” 
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The remainder of this paper is divided into three main sections. In Section 2 we 
present an example. In Section 3 we develop a general framework that in subsequent 
Section 4 enables us to state and prove our main proposition and corollaries, the essence 
of which are conditions under which, in spite of being quadruply gainful, trade can lower 
global social welfare. A brief Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. An example 
A numerical illustration helps to demonstrate that a “trembling trade” can arise even 
when trade between two populations, P1 and P2, is quadruply gainful in the sense that:  
1. it increases the income of every individual in P1 and in P2;  
2. it narrows the income gap within P1;  
3. it narrows the income gap within P2;  
4. it narrows the income gap between P2 and P1.  
Let populations P1 and P2 consist, each, of two individuals. We let the initial 
incomes of the individuals in population P1 be 2 and 4, so the average initial income in 
P1 is 3. When trade occurs between P1 and P2, incomes 2 and 4 rise to 6 and 7 
respectively. Consequently, the average post-trade income in P1 is 6.5, and 6.5 > 3. When 
trade occurs, the income gap within P1, when measured as the difference between the 
incomes of the individuals in P1, narrows from 2 to 1. The decreased inequality within 
population P1 is also indicated by a lower Gini index, GI. For a population of n  
individuals where ix  is the income of individual i, {1, 2, , }ni  , GI is defined as 
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Thus, the pre-trade GI of population P1 is 
1
4 2 1
2(4 2) 6
PREGI
−
=
+
= , and the post-trade GI of 
population P1 is 
1
7 6 1 1
.
2(7 6) 26 6
POSTGI
−
= 
+
=  
We let the initial incomes of the individuals in population P2 be 8 and 12, so the 
average initial income in P2 is 10. When trade occurs with P1, incomes 8 and 12 rise to 
10 and 13 respectively. The average post-trade income in P2 is, then, 11.5, and 11.5 > 10. 
When trade occurs, the income gap within P2 narrows from 4 to 3. The GI of population 
P2 is lowered: the pre-trade GI of population P2 is 
2
12 8 1
2(12 8) 10
PREGI
−
=
+
= , and the post-
trade GI of population P2 is 
2
13 10 3 1
.
2(13 10) 46 10
POSTGI
−
= 
+
=   
The initial gap between the average incomes of P2 and P1 is 10 3 7.− =  The post-
trade gap between the two populations, when measured as the difference between the 
average incomes of P2 and P1, is 11.5 6.5 5,− =  and 5 < 7. The corresponding GI shrinks: 
the pre-trade GI of population 21 ,P P  that is, the GI when the set of incomes of the 
individuals in 21P P  is {2,4,8,12} , is 
3
(12 8) (12 4) (12 2) (8 4) (8 2) (4 2) 17
4(12 8 4 2) 52
PREGI
− + − + − + − + − + −
=
+ + +
= , whereas the post-
trade GI of population 21P P , that is, when the set of incomes of the individuals is 
{6,7,10,13}, is  
3
(13 10) (13 7) (13 6) (10 7) (10 6) (7 6) 1 17
.
4(13 10 7 6) 6 52
POSTGI
− + − + − + − + − + −
= 
+ + +
=  
We assume that the individuals derive utility from (absolute) income, and 
disutility from low relative income, and that they assign the weight ( )0,1   to the 
disutility from low relative income, and the weight 1 −  to the utility from (absolute) 
income. We use a standard measure of relative income deprivation: the aggregate of the 
excesses of the incomes of others in the individual’s comparison group, divided by the 
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size of this group.2 Namely we assume that the utility function of the individual is given 
by  
 ) (1 ) ( ,, , )( m m RDm m mU  = − −   
where m  stands for the individual’s income; m  is the income vector of the individual’s 
comparison group including the individual (prior to trade, this group is population P1 or 
population P2, whereas post trade this group is population 21P P ); and RD  is the 
disutility experienced by the individual from relative income deprivation, which in turn is 
defined as  
 
1
 , ) max { ,0},(
| |
x mm x m
m
RD m  −   
where | |m  denotes the size of the vector .m  
Given this utility characterization, we obtain the following results regarding the 
changes in a utilitarian measure of social welfare brought about when trade occurs 
between the two populations. When, for example, we write next ( )2, (2,4) ,U  2 is m and 
(2,4) stands for .m  The level of social welfare of the pre-trade, autarkic P1 is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2,(2,4) 4,(2,4) 1 2 1 4 4 2 6 7
2
PRESW U U

  = + = − + − − − = − .  
The level of social welfare of the pre-trade, autarkic P2 is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 8,(8,12) 12,(8,12) 1 8 1 12 12 8 20 22
2
PRESW U U

  = + = − + − − − = − . 
The level of social welfare of post-trade P1 when the P1 individuals are in the 
comparison group with income vector (6,7,10,13), namely of P1 as part of an integrated 
21 ,P P is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 6, (6,7,10,13) 7, (6,7,10,13) 1 6 1 7 1 4 7 3 6
4
13 18.25 .
POSTSW U U

 

= + = − + − − + + + +
= −
   
 
2 This measure of relative deprivation is equivalent to a measure of relative deprivation of individual i 
defined as the fraction of the individuals in i’s comparison group whose incomes are higher than the 
income of individual i times the difference between the average income of the higher income individuals 
and i’s income. Stark (2013) provides a brief foray into the concept of relative deprivation and a 
presentation of its measures. 
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The level of social welfare of post-trade P2 when the P2 individuals are in the 
comparison group with income vector (6,7,10,13), namely of P2 as part of an integrated 
21 ,P P is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 10,(6,7,10,13) 13, (6,7,10,13) 1 10 1 13 13 10
4
23 23.75 .
POSTSW U U

 

= + = − + − − −
= −
  
The change of global social welfare brought about by trade is  
2 21 1( ) ( )
(23 23.75 13 18.25 ) (20 22 6 7 )
36 42 (26 29 ) 10 13 .
POST POST PRE PRESW SW SW SW
   
  
+ − +
= − + − − − + −
= − − − = −
 
It follows, then, that global social welfare declines if 10 13 0,−   namely if 
10
13
  . 
 The preceding calculations illustrate a possible occurrence of a “trembling trade” 
even if trade is quadruply gainful. The example in this section rests on several 
simplifying assumptions, especially the strong assumption of linearity of the individuals’ 
utility functions. In the next two sections we present a general modeling framework, and 
we specify conditions under which a “trembling trade” can occur. 
 
3. A theory of a “trembling trade”  
The setting that we consider is the following. We let P1 and P2 be two populations of size 
2n   each, such that individuals {1,2, , }n  belong to population P1, and individuals 
{ 1, 2, , 2 }n n n+ +   belong to population P2.3 Prior to the populations trading with each 
other, members of one population have no ties (and do not compare themselves) with 
members of the other population. The utility function of individual {1, ,2 }ni   whose 
income is im  takes the form  
 ( ) ( ) (, ( , )),i i i i i im g m h RD m mU m = −   (1) 
 
3 The findings reported in this section and in Section 4 do not depend on the assumption that populations P1 
and P2 are of equal size. Making this assumption simplifies the notation, eases the proofs, and allows us to 
focus on the qualitative aspects of our model.  
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where the functions g  and h  are continuous and increasing;4 im  is the vector of the 
incomes of all the individuals in individual i ’s comparison group (including individual i 
himself); and ( )RD   is a measure of low relative income. As in the example of Section 2, 
the ( )RD   of individual i  is defined as 
 
1
, ) ma(
|
x { ,0},
| i
i i m m i
i
RD m m m m
m
 −   
where | |im  denotes the cardinality of the set .im   
We let the individuals in population P1 have pre-trade incomes denoted by 
1 2 nx xx    ( ix  is the income of individual i , {1, , }ni  ), and we let the 
individuals in population P2 have pre-trade incomes denoted by 1 2 ny yy    ( iy  is 
the income of individual n i+ , {1, , }ni  ). We define vectors 1 2, , ,( )nx xx x=  and 
1 2, , ,( )ny yy y= , and we assume that x y , namely that with respect to income 
distributions, populations P1 and P2 are not identical copies of each other. We let 
  
1
( , )() ) (
n
PRE
i i
i
g x g yG x y
=
= +   (2) 
be the sum of the pre-trade levels of utility from income of all the individuals in the two 
populations, and we let 
  
1
( , ) , )( ( ) ( ( , ))
n
PRE
i i
i
h RD x hH RDx y x y y
=
= +   (3) 
be the sum of the pre-trade levels of disutility from relative income deprivation of all the 
individuals in the two populations.  
We assume that when trade occurs between populations P1 and P2, the incomes 
of the members of population P1 represented by the vector 1 2, , ,( )nx xx x=  increase by 
the corresponding amounts from the vector 1 2, , ,( )na aa a= , namely the income of 
individual i  increases by ia , and that the incomes of the members of population P2 
represented by the vector 1 2, , ,( )ny yy y=  increase by the corresponding amounts from 
 
4 Most of the results that follow can be generalized to the case of perfectly heterogeneous populations: the 
assumption that the functions g  and h  are identical for individuals {0,1, , 2 }ni   can be substituted with 
individual-specific functions ig  and ih , respectively. However, such a generalization will make the 
notations and proofs unnecessarily tedious without adding novel insights.  
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the vector 1 2, ,( , ),nb bb b=  namely the income of individual n i+  increases by ib .
5 We 
assume that there exists M +  so that for {1, 2, , }ni  , 
, , , [0, ,, ]i i i i i i i iy b yx x b Ma a+ +  .
6 We let  
 
1
( , , , ) ) )( ][ (
n
POST
i i i i
i
g xG x y a b bga y
=
+ += + , (4) 
and we let 
 1
[ ( (( , , , ) , ( , )
, ( , ))]
)
( (
n
POST
i i
i
i i
H x y a b a x a yh RD x
h RD y
b
b x a y b
=
+
+
= + +
+ ++

  (5) 
be, respectively, the sum of the post-trade levels of utility from income and the sum of 
the post-trade levels of disutility from relative deprivation. From the continuity of the 
functions ,  g h , and RD, it follows that POSTG  and POSTH  are continuous functions of 
,  ,  ,  and  x y a b ; that is, these functions are continuous in the initial incomes, and in the 
income increases brought about by trade. Obviously, ( , ,0,0) ( , ).POST PREx y GG x y=    
We let 1
PRESW  and 2
PRESW  be the pre-trade levels of social welfare of populations 
P1 and P2, respectively, and we let 1
POSTSW  and 2
POSTSW  be the corresponding levels of 
social welfare of the two populations when trade occurs. Prior to trade, members of each 
population compare themselves only with members of their own population; the 
population that they belong to constitutes their exclusive comparison group. When trade 
occurs, however, members of each population compare themselves also with members of 
the other population, so that the members of both populations constitute the comparison 
group of each individual. This revision of the comparison groups arises from the merging 
of social spheres brought about by trade, as explained in Section 1. 
We measure the social welfare of a population in a utilitarian manner, namely as 
the sum of the utility levels of the members of the population. We study the possible 
 
5 The vectors a and b stand for the net gains from trade, namely the gains that accrue after deducting all 
related costs such as the cost of entering foreign markets, transport, advertising, and the like, referred to, for 
example, by Melitz (2003), and Helpman et al. (2004).  
6 Although this assumption is made purely for technical reasons (so that the supremum norm on the space 
0C  of continuous functions, the domains of which are equal to a given closed interval, will be well 
defined), the assumption is sensible if we reason that there is an upper limit on income, and that people do 
not earn less than 0.  
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prevalence of a “trembling trade” defined, as already mentioned, as a situation in which 
the gains from trade are overtaken by the losses in terms of relative deprivation, with the 
result that global social welfare is reduced. That is, a “trembling trade” arises when 
 1 21 2 .
POST POST PRE PRESW SW SW SW+  +  
Based on the definitions provided in (2) through (5), we can rewrite this inequality as  
 [ ( , )] [ ( , )]( , , , ) ( , , 0, ) ,POST PRE POST PREx y a b G H xG x y a H xby y− − −   (6) 
which constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for trade to be trembling. The 
first bracketed term in (6) represents the aggregate gain from trade that arises from 
increases in incomes, and the second bracketed term in (6) represents the aggregate loss 
from trade that arises from the increase in the levels of relative deprivation. The 
difference between the two bracketed terms is the change in global social welfare. 
We next define an auxiliary function   that represents the change in the sum of 
the levels of social welfare of the two populations when trade occurs. Formally, the 
function 2 4: [0, ] ,nM  →  where 0{ [0, ], ) :( is incre }asingf C M f =   with the 
standard 0C -topology, is given by:7 
 ( , , , , , ) ( , ) [ ( ,( , , , ) ( , , , ) )].POST PRE POST PREGg h x y a b x y a b G H xx ya b Hy y x − −= −   (7) 
Because a fixed 6-tuple 2 4( , , , , , ) [0, ] ng h x y a b M   fully characterizes the model of 
trade and of changes of the levels of social welfare, we refer to the arguments of the   
function as the parameters of the model. These parameters are the initial incomes in the 
two populations, the gains from trade of the members of the two populations, and the 
utility functions of these members. We refer to 2 4[0, ] nM   as the space of parameters, 
and we denote by 2 4[0, ] nT M   the set of the parameters generating a “trembling 
trade.” From (6) and (7), we get that 
 1(( ,0)).T  − −=   
We now state and prove four lemmas that in combination provide a basis for 
subsequently stating and proving our main proposition and corollaries.  
 
7 This is the topology given by the supremum norm: for 
0 ([0, ], ),f C M
[0, ]
|| ||  sup | ( ) | .
x M
f f x

=  
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Lemma 1. If there are no gains from trade (meaning if 
1 1( ,, , ) ( , ) (0, ,0)n na b ba  =  =  ), then the sum of the post-merger levels of relative 
deprivation of individuals {1,2, , 2 }n  is greater than the sum of the pre-merger levels of 
relative deprivations of the same individuals, namely 
 
1 1
, ( , ) , ( , )[ ( ) ( [ ()] , ) , )]( .
n n
i i i i
i i
RD x RD y RD x RD yx y x y x y
= =
+  +   (8) 
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Lemma 2. The function   is continuous.  
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Lemma 3. Let h    be the set of functions h  satisfying the condition 
( , ,0,0) ( , )POST PREH x y H x y  for any 2[0, ]( , ) nx y M  such that .x y  Then, for any 
2,  and ,  [0, ]( , ) ,nhg x yh M    assuming once more that ,x y  there exists a U -
open neighborhood of (0,0)  in 2[0, ] nM  such that for any ( , ) ,a b U  ( , , , , , .)g h x y a b T  
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The meaning of Lemma 3 is that if only ( , ,0,0) ( , ),POST PREH x y H x y  then for 
any initial income vectors of the two populations and for any function g  transforming 
income into utility, a “trembling trade” occurs when the income gains from trade are 
sufficiently small. The assumption ( , ,0,0) ( , )POST PREH x y H x y  has a natural 
interpretation: if a merger were to occur of populations P1 and P2 without any gains from 
trade, then it would increase the aggregate disutility (social dismay) from relative 
deprivation. This assumption is satisfied for a wide class of functions. For example, as is 
formally shown in the following lemma, every linear function h  belongs to .h  
Lemma 4. Let L    be the set of increasing linear functions, namely 
{ : [0, ] ; (0, )}L f M t t → =  å . Then, .hL     
Proof. In the Appendix. 
We now have in place the infrastructure required to present the main result of this 
section: the occurrence of a “trembling trade” is not singular in the space of the 
parameters of the model (namely the admissible initial incomes, the gains from trade, and 
the utility functions of the individuals): a “trembling trade” occurs for an open set in this 
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space. In particular, trade is trembling if the initial income vectors of populations P1 and 
P2 are not identical, the function h  (namely the relative deprivation component of the 
utility function) is sufficiently close to being linear, and the gains from trade are 
relatively modest. We then have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. T  is nonempty and open in 2 4[0, ]M  . Moreover, 
2 2([0, ] {( , ) [0, ] }) {(0,0)} .: x yL M x y M T    =‚  
Proof. 1(( ,0)).T  − −=  The set ( ,0)−  is open in ,   is continuous on account of 
Lemma 2, and the counter-image of an open set by a continuous function is open. 
Therefore, T  is open. If 
2 2([0, ] {( , , ( , ) [0, ] }) {(, , , ) ,0)}: 0L M x yg h x y a b x yM   =‚  then Lemmas 3 and 
4 guarantee that ( , , , , , .)g h x y a b T  Therefore, 
2 2([0, ] {( , ) [0, ] }) {(0,0): }x yL M x y M T=    ‚ . At the same time, the sets  , 
L , and 2 2[0, ] {( , ) [ ] }:0,M x y M x y =‚  are nonempty. Thus, 
2 2([0, ] {( , ) [ :0, ] }) {(0,0)}xL M x y M y  = ‚  is nonempty and, consequently, so 
is .T  Q.E.D.  
 
4. The case of quadruply gainful trade 
To the “trade” model of the preceding section we now add two assumptions: the 
individuals in population P1 are poorer than the individuals in population P2, and trade 
does not affect the ordering of the incomes in the merged population. While the first 
assumption is innocuous, making the second assumption requires commentary. Having 
the ordering reserved guarantees that population P1 stays poorer than population P2 also 
when trade occurs. In addition, the changes in relative deprivation (as defined in Section 
2) are then smooth, which simplifies the notation without loss of generality. In addition, 
making the second assumption is appropriate when considering a short period of time 
after introducing trade, so that incomes did not change rapidly enough to interfere with 
the ordering of incomes. And finally, both assumptions are in line with the motivating 
example of Section 2. Formally, we present these two assumptions, respectively, by  
 1 2 1 2 ,n nx y yx x y       (9) 
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and  
 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 .n n n nx x ya a x a b y b y b+ +  + + +   +     (10) 
We say that trade between population P1 and population P2 is quadruply gainful 
if the following conditions hold:  
 1 2 1 2 0.n na ba b ba         (11) 
A trade of the type described by (11) raises the incomes of all the individuals in the two 
populations, narrows the income gaps between the individuals in population P1, narrows 
the income gaps between the individuals in population P2, and narrows the income gap 
between population P2 and population P1. Thus, when trade occurs that satisfies (11), the 
income inequalities in populations 1P , 2P , and 21P P  (as measured, for example, by 
the Gini index) decrease.  
Comment 1. What we have in (11) is not critical for obtaining the results reported 
later on in this section: the inequalities in (11) set the most favorable conditions that can 
be imagined regarding the effect of trade, namely that everyone’s income increases while 
the income inequality between any two individuals decreases. In drawing on (11), we 
seek to show that even under generously advantageous assumptions, trade can still be 
trembling. Therefore, it is even more plausible for trade to be trembling when the 
conditions are less stringent than in (11). Formally, we can substitute condition (11) with 
another set of strict inequalities, for example 
1 1
,PRE POSTGIGI 
2 2
,PRE POSTGIGI   and 
PRE POS
TOTAL L
T
TOTA
GIGI  , where 
i
GI  denotes the Gini index of population 
i
P  for 1, 2;i =  
TOTAL
GI  
denotes the Gini index of population 21 .P P  The three corollaries presented below will 
hold true, and their proof would need to undergo merely cosmetic changes. Naturally, if 
the vector ( , , , )x y a b  satisfies (9), (10), and (11), then it also satisfies the latter set of 
inequalities, so the new set of conditions is merely weaker. If we wanted to weaken 
condition (11) further, say when we considered a “triply gainful trade” (such that trade 
raises all incomes, brings about convergence between countries, and entails declining 
inequality in the poorer country), we would discard one of the inequalities either in 
condition (11) or from the set of inequalities about the Gini index defined earlier in this 
comment, such that the results of this section would still carry through.    
Under which conditions is a quadruply gainful trade trembling? We let  
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4 : assumptions (9), (10), and condition (1{( , , , 1) ar) [0 e s, ] }.atisfiednx y a b MX =   
That is, X  is the set of the initial income vectors and of the gains from trade such that 
trade is quadruply gainful. X  is an open subset of 4[0, ] nM  because it is defined by a set 
of strict inequalities. Trade is both trembling and quadruply gainful for the set of 
parameters ( , , , , , )g h x y a b  if and only if 2( , , , , , ) ( ).XTg h y b Tx a X   =  From 
Proposition 1, it follows that the following holds true.  
Corollary 1. XT  is nonempty and open in both 
2 X   and 2 4[0, ] .nM   
Proof. X  is open in 4[0, ] ,nM  thus 2 X   is open in 2 4[0, ] .nM   From 
Proposition 1, T  is open in 2 4[0, ] ,nM   thus 2( )XT T X  =  is open in 
2( ).X   
Moreover, by definition, 2( )XT T X  =  is an intersection of two open sets in 
2 4[0, ] ,nM   so xT  is open in 
2 4[0, ] .nM   We let 
2
0 0 0 0  and ( ) ,, , [0, ]
nLg h yx M    and we let 0x  and 0y  satisfy assumption (9), in 
particular 0 0.x y  We know that 0 0 0 0( , , , ,0,0)g h x y  satisfies (9), (10), and a weak-
inequality variant of (11), namely 
 1 2 1 2 0.n na b ba a b        
Thus, 20 0 0 0, , , ,0,( 0)g yxh X  , so every neighborhood of 0 0 0 0( , , , ,0,0)h yg x  in 
2 4[0, ] nM   has a nonempty intersection with 
2 .X   However, by Proposition 1, 
0 0 0 0( , , , ,0,0) ,g h x y T  and T  is open. Then, there exists U -nonempty neighborhood of 
0 0 0 0( , , , ,0,0)g h x y  in 
2 4[0, ] nM   such that .U T  Therefore, 2 )(U X    is 
nonempty, and because 2 2) ) ,( ( XU X X TT     =   it follows that XT  is 
nonempty. Q.E.D. 
Drawing on Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, it can be shown that for any set of 
utility functions of type (1), where ( , ) hg h  , and for any pair of initial income 
vectors ( , )x y  satisfying (9), if the gains from trade are sufficiently small, then trade 
between population P1 and population P2 is trembling. To this end, we have the 
following corollary. 
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Corollary 2. We let 0 0( , ) ,hg h   and we let 
2
0 0( [0) ,, ]
ny Mx   satisfy (9). 
We let 2 4 2: [0, ] [0, ]n np M M→   be the projection of 2 4[0, ] nM   onto its last 2n  
coordinates, namely ( , , , , , ) ( , ).p g h x y a b a b=  Then, there exists an open subset 
2( )XpV     such that for any ( , )a b V  satisfying (10) (with fixed 0 0, ))( , ) (x y x y=  
and (11), trade that increases the incomes of members of population P1 by a  and of 
members of population P2 by b  is trembling. Moreover, {(0,0)}V   is a neighborhood 
of 2[0,(0,0) .] nM   
Proof. It suffices to define 2( )UV p  = , for U  defined in the same way as in 
the proof of Corollary 1. By definition, V  has the properties listed in Corollary 2. Q.E.D. 
Let ( , , , )x y a b X  be a fixed set of conditions generating a quadruply gainful 
trade. The following question remains: is it possible to construct a pair of functions 
2( , )g h   such that ( , , , , , ) ,Xg h x y a b T  meaning: is there a pair of utility functions of 
type (1) such that trade is trembling? If we restrict the set of functions by adding the 
condition that h L  (that is, if we take h  to be linear and increasing), then the necessary 
and sufficient condition for trade to be trembling is that the level of aggregate relative 
deprivation of the trading populations P1 and P2 when these populations are brought into 
the same social space via trade is higher than the sum of the levels of the aggregate 
relative deprivation of population P1 and of population P2 when apart (that is, in the 
absence of trade). Formally, this condition is represented by  
 
 
 
1
1
, ( , ) , ( , ))
, ) ,
( ) (
)( ( .
n
i i i i
i
n
i i
i
a x a y b b x a yRD x RD y
RD x R y
b
x yD
=
=
+
 +
+ + + + + +

  (12) 
We formalize this statement in the next corollary. 
Corollary 3. We let ( , , , ,)x y a b X  and we let .h L  Then a function g  
such that ( , , , , , ) Xg h x y a b T  exists if and only if condition (12) is satisfied. 
Proof. The proof comes in two parts. First, we assume that condition (12) is not 
satisfied, and we fix the parameters of the model ( , , , , , )g h x y a b XL  . Then, the 
opposite of (12) holds, namely  
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1 1
, ) , )] , ( , ) ,[ ( ( [ ( ) ( ]( , ))
n n
i i i i i i
i i
x y a x a y b b x a yRD x RD y R x bD RD y
= =
+  + + + + + ++  , 
and by the linearity of ,h  we get that 
1 1
, ) , ))] ,[ ( ( ( , )
, ( , )))]
) ( ( [ ( ( ))
,( (
n n
i i i i
i i
i i
x y a x ah RD x h RD y h RD x
h RD
y b
b x a y by
= =
+ + +
+ + +
+ 
+
   
which is equivalent to saying that 
( , ( , , , ).)PRE POSTH H x y ax by   
However, g  is increasing, so for any vectors a  and b  that satisfy (11), we get 
( , , , ) ( , ) 0.POST PREx y a b GG x y −  But then,  
( , , , ) ( , ) [ ( ,( , , , ] ,) ) 0POST PRE POST PREx y a b G H x y a b HG x y x y− −−   
which contradicts (6). Therefore, such a trade is not trembling, and ( , , , , , ) .Xg h x y a b T  
Second, we assume that condition (12) is satisfied. We then define 0   as 
follows: 
 
 
 
1
1
, ( , ) , ( , ))
, )
( ) (
( ( ., )
n
i i i i
i
n
i i
i
aRD x RDx a y b b x a y b
x
y
RD x RD y y

=
=
+ + + + ++
+
+
−


  
From the definition of L  we know that there exists (0, )    such that ( )h t t=  for 
every [0, ].t M  We denote 
1
,
n
i
i
A a
=
=  
1
,
n
i
i
B b
=
=  and 
* 0.
A B

 
+
=  We now choose 
g  that satisfies the condition *( )g t t  for (0, ]t M . For example, for any 
*0 ,    we can define g  as 
 ( )g t t=  
for [0, ].t M  Then,  
( , , , ) ( , , , )( , ) [ ( , )] ( 0.)POST PRE POST PREx y a b G H x y aG x y x y A Bb H    − − −  −+ =− =
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Thus, (6) is satisfied, and trade is trembling for the parameters ( , , , , , ),g h x y a b  namely 
for ( , , , , , ) .Xg h x y a b T
8 Q.E.D. 
In the simple case in which g  and h  are both linear, the utility function of 
individual i  takes a form that is equivalent to  
 ( ) (1 ) ( ( , )),i i i i im m RD mU m = − −  (13)  
for some [0,1].   The next corollary presents a straightforward generalization of the 
example constructed in Section 2.  
Corollary 4. We let ( , , , ,)x y a b X  and we let the utility function of individual i  
be defined by (13). Then, condition (12) is satisfied if and only if there exists * 1   such 
that trade is trembling for any *, ]( 1  .  
Proof. If (12) is not satisfied, then trade is not trembling, as per the first part of 
the proof of Corollary 3. 
If (12) is satisfied, then we only need to replicate the second part of the proof of 
Corollary 3 for  =  and * *.1 = −  Thus, * 1
A B



−
+
=
+
, and if *( ,1]  , then 
trade is trembling. Q.E.D. 
In the example presented in Section 2, namely for initial incomes 
1 2 1 2 12, 4, 8 2,x x y y= == =  and gains from trade, 1 2 1 24, 3, 2, 1,a a b b= = = =  (12) is 
satisfied: 
1 1 1
[(13 10) (13 7) (13 6) (10 7) (10 6) (7 6)] 6 3 (4 2) (12 8),
4 2 2
− + − + − + − + − + − =  = − + −   
and applying the notation from the proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4, we get that 
6 3 3 = − = , 4 3 7,A = + =  2 1 3B = + = , *
3 10
1
3 7 3 13
 = − =
+ +
. By Corollary 4, for 
10
( ,1]
13
   trade is trembling. 
 Comment 2. An interesting issue to address is what is the relative size of the set 
XT  of the parameters generating a “trembling trade” in the set of all the parameters for 
 
8 XT  is open, so 
ˆˆ( , , , , , ) Xg h x y a b T  also holds true for each 
ˆˆ( , )g h  that belongs to a sufficiently close 
neighborhood of ( , )g h  in 
2.   
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which trade is quadruply gainful, namely 2 ?X   The results presented thus far are 
existential in nature: while we showed that such a set is open and, therefore, the 
phenomenon of a quadruply gainful trembling trade is not singular, it is possible that this 
open set is so small that its real-life applications are limited. In particular, it seems 
possible that a trembling trade may occur only from small gains from trade, and only for 
utility functions in which a major part of value arises from the disutility of low relative 
income. In general, such a problem has no clear solution: we do not have a natural, well-
defined measure on the space of parameters so that even the formal definition of the 
problem is unclear. Fixing utility functions and considering the size of the set of vectors 
4( , , , ) [0, ] ny a b Mx   generating a “trembling trade” will provide us with different results, 
depending on the choice of utility functions. 
Having said that, it is helpful to refer again to the example presented in Section 2 
in order to somewhat dispel the doubts. Trade in that example is quadruply gainful and is 
trembling, and the gains from trade are far from tiny: the income of every individual 
increases by at least 8.3% (in the case of the richest individual), the income of the poorest 
individual increases by 200%. At the same time, according to our calculations, more than 
20% of the space of utility functions satisfying (13) (measured by the parameter )  
guarantees that trade is trembling. Thus, we conclude that the set XT  does not have to be 
very small. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Trade that increases the incomes of the members of the trading populations and reduces 
the income gaps between and within populations can intuitively be considered to be 
gainful. However, we showed that even under very favorable assumptions as given by a 
quadruply gainful trade, it is possible that when trade occurs global social welfare may 
not improve. Acknowledging that individuals take into consideration not only the comfort 
of absolute income but also the discomfort of low relative income, we noted that the 
dismay brought about from expansion of the social space of the members of the trading 
populations can override the gains from trade. This finding could help explain anti-trade 
sentiments among populations that engage in a seemingly advantageous trade. For 
example, Nguyen (2015) argues that concern for inequality is an important factor of the 
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decreasing support for liberal trade policies in the American public, and that, in general, 
individuals who are more concerned about income inequality are more likely to support 
protectionist measures. Burgoon (2013) finds that income inequalities encourage support 
for political parties with protectionist and anti-globalist agendas in OECD countries. 
Consequently, as Marktanner and Sayour (2009) show, countries characterized by higher 
levels of income inequality are less likely to liberalize trade as they perceive trade to 
exacerbate inequality. Distaste for low relative income may also be a reason why Scheve 
and Slaughter (2006) find that anti-trade sentiments are stronger in countries with higher 
unemployment rates. On the other hand, in developing countries (for example, in the 
Philippines, as pointed out by Pasadilla and Liao, 2005), even the wealthiest may be 
concerned about income comparisons with potential trade partners abroad and, therefore, 
they oppose unrestricted trade.  
Our analysis bears significantly on policy design because it implies that often-
prescribed policy recommendations aimed at redressing a downside of trade can well fall 
short. To see this vividly, we refer to a May 2018 interview of the Economist magazine 
with John Van Reenen of MIT.9 When asked “What are the downsides of free trade?” he 
replied as follows: “There are well-known downsides. The way I like to think about it is 
that free trade increases the size of the pie. The overall amount of material wellbeing 
expands. But just because the size of the pie expands, it doesn’t mean that everyone is 
better off. There are going to be some losers whose slice of the pie is so much smaller 
that they would have been better off with less trade. However, because the overall size of 
the pie has got bigger, the government can compensate the losers which can still make 
everyone better off.” This response is telling because it implies that when trade occurs, 
everyone’s income will increase - if not directly because of trade then indirectly because 
of a governmental redistribution of the higher aggregate income conferred by trade - 
social welfare will rise. The approach taken in this paper does not share this perception: 
higher incomes of all members of the trading economies do not necessarily translate into 
a global welfare gain. Interestingly, in another part of the interview John Van Reenen 
intimates that “With free trade, you come into more contact with . . . new people.” We 
 
9 https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/05/04/a-healthy-re-examination-of-free-trades-benefits-
and-shocks 
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showed that when this consequence is weighed in the calculus of the gains from trade, 
trade can be trembling.  
In closing, it is tempting to ponder what the social welfare fallout would be from a 
situation in which a relatively poor economy that geographically neighbors a richer 
economy but trade-wise is detached from the richer economy, embarks on full blown 
trade with the richer economy. The perspective elaborated in this paper can serve as a 
warning sign of a possible adverse outcome. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas 1-4 
Proof of Lemma 1.  
From Stark (2013, Claim 1), we know that if two populations merge while the incomes of 
their members remain unchanged, then the sum of the post-merger levels of relative 
deprivation of the individuals who belong to these populations is not lower than the sum 
of the pre-merger levels of relative deprivation of the same individuals. Thus, for 
inequality (8) to hold strictly, we only need to prove that equality does not occur if .x y  
To this end we assume that 1 2 2, , ,( )nz z zz=   is an ordered vector of incomes of 
population 1 2P P  (namely the sequence z  consists of elements of the sequences x  
and y  in an ascending order). For {1, , 2 },k n   we define ( )xh k  as the number of 
individuals in population P1 whose incomes are less than or equal to ,kz  and we define 
( )yh k  as the number of individuals in population P2 whose incomes are less than or equal 
to .kz   
We use the following result from Stark (2013, Proof of Claim 1, p. 7) for 
populations P1 and P2 of equal size n :   
 ( )
22 2 1
1
1 1 1
, , ) , )
[ ( ) ( )]
]( ) [ ( ( .
2
n n n
y
i i i j j
i i
x
j
z x y
h j h j
RD z RD x RD y z
n
z
−
+
= = =
−
+− = −    (A1) 
Each of the summands on the right-hand side of (A1) is non-negative and, therefore, 
2
1 1
( ) [ ( ( 0, , ) , )]
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x Rx yDz y
= =
− +   . In order for 
2
1 1
( ) [, ( (, ) , )]
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x RD yz x y
= =
− +   to be equal to zero, all the summands on the 
right-hand side of (A1) need to be equal to zero. Hence, for each ,j  either 1 ,j jz z+ =  or 
( ) ( ).y xh j h j=  
Let us assume that 
2
1 1
( ) [ ( ( 0, , ) , )]
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x Rx yDz y
= =
− + =   and based on our 
earlier assumptions, we have that .x y  Then, there are an income level w  and natural 
numbers k l  so that the incomes of exactly k  individuals of population P1 and of 
exactly l  individuals of population P2 are equal to .w  We denote by m  the number of 
23 
 
individuals in population 21P P  whose incomes are less than .w  Then, there are three 
cases to consider: 
I. 0m =  (namely w  is the smallest income in population 21P P ). 
Then, for j k l= + , 1k l k lz w z+ + + = , and ( 1( ) )y xh k l l k h k = ++ = , hence 
2
1 1
, , ) , )( ) [ ( ]( 0.
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x yRDx yz
= =
− +    
II. 2m n k l= − −  (namely w  is the highest income in population 21P P ). 
Then, 2 1 2n k l n k lz w z− − + − −=  , and (2 ),(2 )y xnh n k l k hn l n k l− − = −  − = − −  
hence 
2
1 1
, , ) , )( ) [ ( ]( 0.
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x yRDx yz
= =
− +    
III. 0 2 .m n k l  − −   
Then, 1m mz z+  , thus for 
2
1 1
( ) [ ( ( 0, , ) , )]
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x Rx yDz y
= =
− + =   it is 
necessary that )( ) (y xh m h m= . Then, 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x y ym k l h m k h m l h m l h m k lh + + = +  + = + = + + , and 
2 1 2n k l n k lz w z− − + − − = , hence 
2
1 1
, , ) , )( ) [ ( ]( 0.
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x yRDx yz
= =
− +    
Each of the three cases I, II, and III thus leads to a contradiction. Therefore, when 
populations P1 and P2 are not identical with respect to their vectors of incomes then, 
indeed, 
2
1 1
, , ) , )( ) [ ( ]( 0,
n n
i i i
i i
RD z RD x yRDx yz
= =
− +    which is equivalent to stating that 
1 1
, ( , ) , ( , )[ ( ) ( [ ()] , ) , )]( .
n n
i i i i
i i
RD x RD y RD x RD yx y x y x y
= =
+  +   Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2.  
Using the definitions of    an, d  , ,PRE POST PRE POSTG H HG  as given in (2) through (5), we 
can rewrite the formula of function   presented in (7) as follows:  
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1
1
) ) ( )]
,
( , ,
( , )) , ( , ))
, , , ) [ (
, ) , )
( ) (
[ ( ( ( (
( ( )].( (
n
i i i i i i
i
n
i i i i
i
i i
a b g x
a x a y b b x a
g h x y a b g x g y g y
yh RD bx h R
x
D y
h RD x h RD y y

=
=
= + + −
− + + + + + +
+ −
+
− −

  
Because the functions g, h, and RD  are continuous,   is also continuous. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3.  
We fix 2, ( , ) ,, [0, ] nhh Mg x y    assuming that x y . We let 
( , ,0,0) 0( , )POST PREH x y H x y − = . As already noted following (5), because h  is 
continuous, then 
POSTH  is continuous too. And because of the continuity of ,POSTH  there 
exists 1U  - an open neighborhood of (0,0)  such that for each 1( , ) :b Ua   
| ( , ,0,0) ( , , , ) |
2
POST POSTH x y H x y a b

−  . 
In particular, ( , , , ) 0.(
2
, )POST PREH x y a b H x y

 −  
At the same time, because of the continuity of 
POSTG (recalling (4)), there exists 
2U - an open neighborhood of (0,0)  such that for each 2( , )a b U : 
| ( , ) ( , , , ) | | ( , ,0,0) ( , , , ) |
2
PRE POST POST POSTG x y G x y a b G x y G x y a b

− = −  .  
Therefore, there exists 1 2U UU=   - an open neighborhood of (0,0)  such that for any 
( , ) :a b U  
( , ) | ( , ) ( , , , ) |
( , ) | | ( , ,0,0) ( , , , ) |
( , )
( , , , )
2
| ( , ,0,0)
2
| ( , , , ) | ( , ).( , , , )
POST PRE PRE POST
POST PRE POST POST
POST PRE POST PRE
G x y G x y G x y a b
x y H x
x y a b G
H x y H x y a by H
H x x y x yy a b H H x y a b H



− 
= −  −
− 
= −
− −
 −
  
Thus, (6) is satisfied, trade is trembling, and ( , , , , , .)g h x y a b T  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 4.  
We let (0, ),    and we let h L  be given by ( )h t t=  for [0, ].t M  By Lemma 1, 
when ,x y   
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1 1
[ ( ( [ (, ) , )] , ( , ) ,) ( ( , ))]
n n
i i i i
i i
x y x yRD x RD y R xD x RD y y
= =
++    
and, consequently, 
1 1
[ ( ( [ (, ) , )] , ( , ) , ( , ))) ( ],
n n
i i i i
i i
x y x yRD x RD y RD x RD x yy   
= =
+ +   
which is equivalent to 
1 1
, ) , ))] , ( , )[ ( ( ) ( ( [ ( ( )) ( , ( , )))],(
n n
i i i i
i i
h RD x h RD y h RD xx y x y h RD y x y
= =
+ +   
and, thus, 
( , ) ( , ,0,0).PRE POSTH x y H x y   
Therefore, .hh  Q.E.D.  
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